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Abstract
Privatization in India has been limited to the di¤use sale of minor-
ity stakes in …rms. Since control rights have not been transferred to
private owners it is widely contended that the process has had little
impact on …rm behavior. We …nd however that even the sale of minor-
ity stakes has a positive impact on …rm performance and productivity.
As the government remains the controlling owner in these …rms, we
infer that the improvement is attributable to the role of the stock mar-
ket in monitoring managerial performance rather than to a change in
owners’ objectives. Consistent with this interpretation, we …nd that
improvements in earnings are due to an increase in the productivity
of labor rather than layo¤s. Partial privatization continues to a¤ect
the sales and operating e¢ciency of …rms when we control for compet-
itive conditions, and the evidence also suggests that privatization and
competition have a complementary impact on …rm performance.
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11 Introduction
The economic transition of socialist economies and the trend towards pri-
vatization within both developing and developed market economies have
generated a large empirical literature on the e¤ect of ownership on …rm per-
formance. Most of these studies …nd that privatization has a positive impact
on the pro…tability and e¢ciency of …rms (see Megginson and Netter, 2001,
for a recent survey). The …rms in these studies have had a majority of
their assets privatized and control rights have been transferred from the
government to private owners. Surprisingly little is known about the ef-
fect of partial privatization in which control rights are not transferred, even
though most privatization transactions of signi…cant size are partial sales of
equity often through the stock market. This paper uses information on the
fraction of equity sold through partial privatizations in India to investigate
whether the performance of government-owned …rms is a¤ected by the sale
of minority stakes.
In a sample of 630 privatization o¤ers from 59 countries, Jones, Meggin-
son, Nash, and Netter, (1999) …nd that an average of 36:8% of capital is sold
in these o¤ers, with less than 8% of the …rms selling a 100% of their capital.
India’s privatization program too has proceeded slowly with an average of
16 percent of equity in 44 of 258 centrally-owned …rms sold in the ten years
following the adoption of the privatization policy in 1991.1 Through 1999
the government had raised only about $4 billion according to the Depart-
ment of Disinvestment (2001),2 and South Asia’s share of total privatization
revenues raised by developing countries was just 4 percent in 1999, while
Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for 54 per cent (World Bank,
2001). The pace has picked up slightly in recent years with …ve …rms being
sold to strategic partners in the last two years 3 but sale of non-controlling
shares remains the primary method of privatization.
The theoretical literature on privatization considers two types of prob-
lems associated with government ownership: the political problem that po-
litical interference distorts the objectives and constraints faced by managers
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) and the managerial problem that poor monitor-
ing leads to low-powered incentives among managers (Vickers and Yarrow,
1The total number of …rms includes both …nancial and non-…nancial …rms.
2The World Bank reports $8:83 billion in privatization revenues between 1991 and 1999
(World Bank, 2001).
3These are Modern Foods and Lagan Jute Machinery (74% stake in each sold in 2000),
Bharat Aluminium Company, Computer Maintenance Corporation (51% stake in each
sold in 2001) and Hindustan Teleprinters Limited (74% stake sold in 2001).
21989).4 In …rms that have been fully privatized it is di¢cult to identify
whether the observed improvements in …rm performance occur because the
new owners pursue pro…t maximization rather than other objectives, or be-
cause the new owners are better able to monitor managers. Partial priva-
tization without transfer of control allows us to concentrate on the second
possibility. The …rm remains under government control and subject to polit-
ical interference, but the trading of shares on public stock markets provides
current information on the …rm’s performance as judged by market partic-
ipants. This information can be used by the state to better monitor the
managers, and can also be used by managers in the executive job market as
a public signal of their performance.
India’s adoption of the disinvestment policy was accompanied by two
other policies that allow us to investigate the relative e¤ects of privatization
and competition. “Dereservation” eliminated restrictions on private entry
into all but 4 out of 17 sectors that used to be reserved for the public sector.
At the same time, restrictions on foreign equity investments were liberalized
in all but a few sectors of the economy. While some have argued that man-
ager incentives can be shaped better by competition (Vickers and Yarrow,
1989), others argue that so long as public sector …rms are characterized by
political interference and poor governance, ine¢ciencies cannot be fully ad-
dressed by increased competition (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). By controlling
for changes in competitive conditions we are also able to ensure that changes
in …rm behavior are not incorrectly attributed to privatization.
We observe …rm level panel data on the population of non-…nancial pub-
lic sector …rms owned by the central (federal) government of India, account-
ing for approximately 85 percent of the overall assets of non-…nancial …rms
owned by the state and central governments. We observe the pre and post-
privatization performance of all 36 …rms privatized by the central govern-
ment upto 1998.5 The data extends for nine years starting from 1990, the
year prior to the economic reforms undertaken in 1991. We also include
about 44 manufacturing and non-…nancial service sector …rms owned by
regional governments. The accounting information was compiled from an-
nual income statements and has been used recently by Bertrand, Mehta, and
Mullainathan (2001), among others. We supplement this data with informa-
tion on employment from annual surveys of public enterprises published by
the government, and with information on privatization transactions for each
…rm obtained from newspaper reports, government sources, and the World
4LaPorta and Lopez-di-Silanes (1999) also use this categorization.
5We also observe the pre-privatization performance of the 8 …rms sold since 1998.
3Bank. We have information on the fraction of equity sold in each …rm in a
given year. The e¤ect of market reforms on …rm performance is captured by
the two policy measures described earlier: dereservation, where after nearly
forty years of protection, 13 out of 17 protected sectors were opened to do-
mestic and foreign private participation; and liberalization, which allowed
for automatic approval of foreign participation in certain sectors.
Comparing the mean performance of …rms in the years prior to the …rst
tranche of partial privatization to average performance in the years following
the …rst tranche, we …nd signi…cant di¤erences in revenues, labor produc-
tivity, and the share of government loans in the total borrowings of …rms.
Compared to average performance in the prior years, sales and pro…ts in-
crease by 59 percentage points and 22.6 percentage points respectively, and
the fraction of loans …nanced by the government declines by 5.8 percentage
points. On the other hand employment does not appear to change signi…-
cantly after partial privatization. To control for …rm-speci…c and macroeco-
nomic factors that could account for performance change, we also estimate
…rm …xed e¤ects speci…cations to investigate the average impact of partial
privatization on …rm performance, using …rms that remain wholly owned by
the government as the control group. We …nd that a 10 percentage point
decrease in the share of government equity would increase sales by 27 per-
centage points, pro…ts by 15 percentage points, average product of labor
(sales over labor) by 6 percentage points, and returns to labor (operating
income over employment) by 8 percentage points. However, there is no
accompanying decline in employment.
The results also indicate that partial privatization continues to have a
signi…cant impact on …rm performance when we control for competitive con-
ditions. Firms in sectors that were previously reserved for the government
are found to react favorably to dereservation as seen by signi…cantly higher
sales revenues and pro…ts. On the other hand we …nd that liberalizing re-
strictions on foreign participation has an adverse impact on sales. Unlike
privatization, changes in competitive conditions do not appear to a¤ect pro-
ductive e¢ciency as measured by the average product of labor and returns
to labor. However competitive pressures do have an impact on allocative
e¢ciency since they appear to reduce employment. These results suggest
that improvements in …rm performance can be brought about through a
combination of privatization and competition enhancing policies.
We also …nd evidence that the share of government loans in total bor-
rowing has a statistically signi…cant and negative impact on both sales and
pro…ts which is consistent with the view that the government may use loans
to pursue objectives other than pro…t maximization. However, it does not
4appear that soft budget constraints a¤ect the level of employment in these
…rms.6
The …xed e¤ects speci…cation takes into account selection bias arising
out of time invariant unobservable factors that a¤ect performance, such as
would occur if more pro…table or larger …rms are selected for privatization.
In the estimations we also include …rm speci…c controls and year dummies
to control for contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks. To the extent that
selection may be dynamic, as when …rms are being sold because they have
better management or they are able to adjust better to market reforms, and
these characteristics are unobservable (to the researcher) and shifting over
time, …xed e¤ects estimates would be inconsistent. It is di¢cult to identify
and correct for all such e¤ects, however we use a number of approaches that
potentially address this issue. First, we investigate the impact of the fraction
of equity sold on the performance of privatized …rms in a given year where
the control group consists of …rms that have been selected for privatization
in later years. Frydman et al. (1999) argue that the control group of …rms
would share similar unobservable characteristics that materialize over time
hence this method would potentially address dynamic selection. We …nd that
the results reported earlier do not change. Second, like Bartel and Harrison
(2001) we compare the pre-privatization performance of …rms to …rms that
are not privatized to check whether there is selection based on unusually
good or bad performance just prior to privatization which could lead to
under or overestimation of the e¤ect of privatization (Ashenfelter, 1978), and
again do not …nd evidence of selection. Third, we estimate all speci…cations
excluding the oil and gas companies which are arguably the most pro…table
and have the greatest potential in terms of future pro…tability among the
state-owned …rms, and …nd that the results remain similar.
In the next section we describe the main characteristics of India’s eco-
nomic reforms and its public sector. Following this we brie‡y discuss the
theory on ownership and empirical implications for the data. Sections 4
and 5 describe the data, results, and potential problems with the estimation
strategy that we address. We conclude and discuss extensions in Section 6.
2 Background of the Indian privatization program
In response to a foreign exchange crisis in 1991, India undertook sweeping
economic reforms which included deregulation and privatization. Since the
6However soft budget constraints do have a signi…cant negative impact on employment
as we shall see in Section 5.3 below, when we consider a smaller sample of …rms.
5Industrial Policy Resolution of 1991 which outlined the economic reforms,
the privatization goal declared in every government’s annual budget is to
reduce government ownership to 26 per cent of equity in all non-strategic
…rms.7 Euphemistically referred to as “disinvestment”, privatization has
proven to be the most di¢cult to implement of all the reforms. To date
the disinvestment process in …rms owned by the federal government has
consisted of the sale of an average of 16 per cent of equity in 44 …rms
out of 258 …nancial and non-…nancial …rms, including the strategic sale of
three …rms between 1999 and 2001 and the approval of another …ve …rms in
late 2001.8 There were 14 rounds of disinvestment between 1991 and 2000
through which the government raised about $4 billion in revenues (Depart-
ment of Public Enterprises, 2001 and Department of Disinvestment, 2001).
In the …rst round in 1991 and 1992 the government raised $638 million in
revenues through the sale of between 5 and 20 per cent of equity in 31 …rms.9
Bundles of shares in these …rms were sold mainly to domestic …nancial in-
stitutions. In response to allegations that shares had been sold at too low
a price in the …rst round, bundling of shares was abandoned and shares of
each company were sold by auction between 1992 and 1993. In 1994 the
government permitted the participation of foreigners, and in the disinvest-
ments of 1996-1999, …rms in the telecommunications, oil, and construction
sectors were sold via global depository receipts in international markets in
addition to sales in domestic capital markets. A controversial event of the
disinvestment process was the purchase of equity in state-owned companies
by other state-owned companies in 1999. Our data includes privatization
transactions between 1991 and 1998, hence we do not consider …rms that
sold equity to other state-owned …rms nor do we observe the full privati-
zation of three companies between 1999 and 2001. We have also checked
stock-market participation among the partially privatized …rms in our sam-
ple and …nd that with the exception of 2 …rms, all the other privatized …rms
in our sample are listed with their shares being traded on the stock market
since they were privatized, and not prior to that. The remaining 2 …rms are
owned by state governments and are not publicly traded.
Large-scale government ownership of …rms in India was originally justi-
…ed by concerns that the private sector would not undertake projects requir-
ing large investments with long gestation periods. Starting in the late 1960s
7Strategic …rms are those in the defense, atomic energy, and railway sectors. 26% is
the minimum amount of equity necessary for some certain voting powers.
8Our data ends in 1998 and we observe all 36 …rms sold by the central government
upto that year.
9Rs 30.38 billion converted at Rs 47 = $1 into current dollars.
6there was a period of rapid nationalization of …rms in all sectors, so that
by the mid-seventies the public sector accounted for one-…fth of GDP and
two-thirds of the total …xed capital invested in the economy (Goyal, 1999).
The Indian public sector consists of departmental enterprises that are run
directly by government ministries, such as the railways, the postal service,
telecommunications, irrigation, and power, and enterprises that have sepa-
rate boards of directors. At the end of 1992 there were 1180 …rms in which
the government was the majority owner, 941 of which were owned by state
governments. However, …rms owned by the central government account for
nearly 85 per cent of the overall assets of state-owned companies. Over 42
per cent of the …rms owned by the central government are in manufacturing,
28:62 per cent in mining, and nearly 20 per cent are utilities, while a third
of state government …rms are in manufacturing, with the remaining …rms
primarily concentrated in agriculture and …nance (Goyal, 1999). Public sec-
tor …rms are large employers, with 2 million workers employed in central
government …rms in the nineties, accounting for 10 per cent of the total
workforce in the organized sector.10
The disinvestment program has not moved as fast as planned. So far
control has been transferred in just three …rms to private owners. Further,
in every year except 1991 and 1998, disinvestment revenues have fallen short
of the targets set by the government in its annual budget (in 1999 the gov-
ernment achieved just 18 per cent of its revenue target). Finally, the public
sector remains unpro…table, with an average ratio of after-tax pro…ts to net
sales of ¡4:38% in public sector manufacturing enterprises between 1991
and 1997 compared to 6:65% for private sector manufacturing …rms (De-
partment of Disinvestment, 2001). Nearly half the public sector enterprises
owned by the federal government are loss-making. In the government’s own
words, privatization would help in: “releasing huge amounts of scarce pub-
lic resources locked up in non-strategic PSEs (public sector enterprises) for
deployment in areas such as public health, education, etc.; stemming the
further out‡ow of scarce public resources for sustaining the unviable en-
terprises; reducing public debt; transferring the commercial risk, to which
tax-payers’ money is exposed, to the private sector; releasing other tangi-
ble and intangible resources, such as, large manpower currently locked up
in managing PSEs, for redeployment in areas that are much higher on the
social priority” (Department of Disinvestment, 2001).
10The total workforce in the organized sector (registered companies) was estimated
at 27 million in 1997, with 20 million employed in central and state governments, and
government enterprises (Department of Disinvestment, 2001).
7Prior to 1991 India had an elaborate regulatory framework which in-
volved restrictions on who could invest, how much, in what, and where.
Despite the licensing requirements,11 the foreign ownership restrictions, and
the restrictions on monopolistic business practices, not a single violation of
any of these regulations was prosecuted in four decades. Instead, rampant
rent-seeking led to an ine¢cient use of resources to circumvent the numer-
ous regulations. While deregulation started in the mid-seventies, it was not
until 1991 that most of the restrictions on business practices were removed.
The main deregulatory measures undertaken in 1991 that a¤ected the public
sector were those allowing private sector participation in sectors previously
reserved for the government and dispensing with ceilings on foreign equity.
Dereservation reduced the number of sectors reserved for the public sector
from seventeen to four. Only arms and ammunition, atomic energy produc-
tion, mining of minerals related to atomic energy, and railway transportation
remain closed to the private sector.12 Since 1991 there have been a num-
ber of joint ventures between public sector companies in dereserved sectors
and domestic and foreign companies, including the ventures between Indian
Oil Company and Mobil; IBP (retailer for gas) and Caltex Petroleum; and
Balmer & Lawrie Freight Containers and Tectrans of Germany.
Another deregulatory measure, which we refer to as liberalization, was
the automatic approval of foreign equity up to 74 per cent in certain sec-
tors.13 Investors still have to obtain government approval in the following
industries: coal and lignite; petroleum; alcohol; sugar; tobacco products;
defense and aerospace equipment; hazardous chemicals; and drugs and phar-
maceutical products.
Following these changes in entry restrictions there have been a number of
domestic and foreign entrants in the energy and telecommunications sectors.
11The “license raj” referred to the process by which …rms had to apply for licenses, or
government approval, for a wide range of activities.
12The sectors reserved for the public sector which were opened to private participation
are Iron and Steel; Heavy Castings and Forgings of Iron and Steel; Heavy Plant and Ma-
chinery for Iron and Steel; Hydraulic and Steam Turbines; Coal and Lignite; Mineral Oils;
Mining of Iron Ore, Manganese, Chrome, Gypsum, Sulphur, Gold and Diamonds, Copper,
Lead, Zin, Tin, Molybdnum, Wolfram; Aircrafts; Air Transportation; Ship Building; Tele-
phones and Telephone Cables; Telegraphs and Wireless Apparatus; and, the Generation
and Distribution of Electricity.
13At the 2-digit SIC level the industries that were liberalized are: Food; Cotton and
other Textiles; Textile Products; Basic Chemicals except Petroleum and Coal; Rubber,
Plastic, Petroleum and Coal Products; Metal Products; Machinery and Equipment; Trans-
port Equipment; Mining Services; Basic metals; Medical Equipment; Construction; and
Land and Water Transportation services. We use two and three digit SIC codes to identify
liberalized and dereserved sectors.
8The foreign …rms include Enron Corporation; Cogentrix; AES Transpower;
Rolls Royce; Powergen; British Telecom; AT&T; Deutsche Telekom; and
Nippon Telegraph. In air transportation a number of domestic and for-
eign joint venture …rms also entered the airline industry, although some of
these …rms eventually exited the market because of continuing government
regulations that favored the state-owned domestic carrier.14
Other deregulation measures undertaken since 1991 include the removal
of the industrial licensing system under which private sector investments had
to be approved by the government; removal of restrictions on investments
made by large business groups; removal of restrictions on industrial location;
and removal of restrictions on the expansion of business groups. Finally, the
government also removed quantity restrictions and reduced import tari¤s in
most sectors.
In our data we investigate the e¤ect of partial privatization and also
control for the e¤ects of dereservation and liberalization.
3 Theory and empirical implications
Ownership structure should not matter if complete contracts can be writ-
ten and enforced (Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1985; and Grossman and Hart,
1986). Public sector …rms are generally argued to be less e¢cient than pri-
vate sector …rms (in relatively competitive markets) because of low-powered
managerial incentives. There are two non-mutually exclusive perspectives
on the causes of poor incentives (La¤ont and Tirole, 1993). First, the polit-
ical perspective argues that a government pursues multiple objectives and
some of these objectives, unlike pro…t maximization, are hard to contract
on. Ownership in this case makes a di¤erence when unforeseen contingencies
arise which are not in the contract between the manager and the govern-
ment. Williamson (1985) argued that in this case public ownership may
be preferable because a social welfare maximizing government could impose
socially desirable outcomes, whereas it would have to bargain with a private
…rm. However, this advantage would disappear in the case of a non-welfare
maximizing government (Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987). Moreover, in the
presence of incomplete contracts, di¤erent government objectives can lead to
expropriation of manager investments and result in suboptimal investment
by managers ex ante (La¤ont and Tirole, 1993). There may also be distor-
14A number of foreign …rms have also exited the market recently as for example the
high-pro…le pull-out of Enron in 2001 due to non-payment by its only customer, a local
government entity.
9tions in the constraints of public sector managers because of the absence of a
credible bankruptcy threat to these …rms. Facing a soft budget constraint,
managers have little incentive to cut costs. Soft budget constraints may
also distort managerial incentives if the government uses loans to pursue
objectives other than pro…t maximization. We test the political perspective
by investigating whether government loans to …rms can explain variation in
…rm performance.
In contrast, the managerial perspective on the advantage of private over
public ownership argues that participation in the stock market gives man-
agers better incentives by monitoring …rm performance and gathering infor-
mation on manager investments. As mentioned in the previous section, none
of the shares of the Indian public sector …rms in our sample were traded on
the stock market prior to disinvesment. Since the extent of market liquidity
a¤ects the incentives of stock market participants to gather information on
…rms (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993) we use data on partial sales of equity
to investigate the theoretical implication that …rm performance will depend
on the fraction of equity sold. A question also arises as to why managers
of public sector …rms who, unlike their private sector counterparts, are not
subject to an active market for corporate control would respond to increased
monitoring of their performance. One reason could be the presence of a mar-
ket for senior executives of public sector …rms, particularly high performing
public sector …rms, who are in demand for their skills (Fama, 1980). A few
public sector …rms have remained without directors or CEOs for a number
of years (Goyal, 1999). Disinvestment could also generate pressure on man-
agers to maintain share value both from workers who are concerned about
the possibility of layo¤s once the …rm is privately controlled and from the
government which is concerned about revenues generated from future sales
of equity in the …rm. Finally, it can be argued that manager do not respond
to increased monitoring but instead to the possibility of losing their jobs
after the …rm is transferred to private owners. However this argument does
not provide an unambiguous impact on managerial incentives since man-
agers could also deliberately worsen or misreport …rm performance so as to
discourage potential buyers and thereby keep their jobs.
One advantage of using data on privatization in India is that it allows us
to investigate whether partial privatization mitigates …rm ine¢ciency from
the managerial perspective, since none of the …rms we consider have been
transferred to private owners. Given that nearly half of all public sector
enterprises are loss making as of the year 2000, it would be di¢cult to argue
that the government pursues a pro…t-maximization objective. Hence our
empirical work also gives an estimate of the extent to which public sector
10ine¢ciency is due to low-powered manager incentives caused by inadequate
monitoring of and information on managers.
To identify the e¤ect of partial privatization on …rm performance we also
consider changes in the competitive environment of the …rms. Liberalization
and dereservation policies consitute a major part of the economic reforms
since 1991, so variation in …rm performance caused by increased competition
may be mistakenly attributed to the disinvestment process. The debate on
the relative importance of competition versus ownership focuses on the e¤ect
of competition on productive e¢ciency, since it is generally accepted that
competition will induce allocative e¢ciency. Competition is said to a¤ect
managers’ incentives because ine¢cient …rms face reduced market share.
Moreover, competition can also be an e¤ective monitoring device because
it facilitates performance comparisons (Hart, 1983). Vickers and Yarrow
(1991) emphasize that e¢ciency gains from privatization will also depend
on competition hence empirically the combined e¤ect of the two policies are
also of interest.
4 Data
We observe privatization status, industry, ownership status, and a range
of accounting data for 341 manufacturing and service sector public …rms
owned by the central and state governments of India. This includes 249
…rms that form the population of non-…nancial …rms owned by the central
government, and 92 …rms that are owned by various state governments. We
observe all the …rms that were partially privatized by the central government
until 1998. Firm level data is obtained from company balance sheets and
annual income statements and have been collected by a private organization,
the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). The panel consists
of the years 1990-1998. We have at least a year of data prior to the economic
reforms which were announced in 1991.
From the full sample we observe current sale revenues for an unbalanced
panel of 2470 …rm years between 1990 and 1998 (an average of 274 …rms
per year). Excluding …rms that do not have information on lagged assets,
the largest available sample for 1991 - 1998 is 2063 …rm years (an average of
258 …rms per year).15 This includes 284 …rm years of observations for …rms
owned by regional governments. In order to avoid exacerbating attrition
15We do not have lagged observations for 1990. There are 220 …rms in 1991, 231 …rms
in 1992, 228 in 1993, 240 …rms in 1994, 244 …rms in 1995, 270 …rms in 1996, 281 …rms in
1997 and 244 …rms in 1998.
11bias we did not require a balanced panel.
While the data contains information on a wide range of income, cost and
investment variables, it does not include ownership information except for
the most current year reported for each …rm. We supplement this data with
information on privatization transactions from the Department of Heavy En-
terprises, India, the World Bank Privatization Transactions Database, and
from newspaper reports. The privatization information we collect includes
the fraction sold of a …rm, the year of sale, and the method of sale which
generally consists of public o¤erings and global depository receipts. There
are 36 …rms in our sample that have been partially privatized with some
…rms being sold in more than one tranche.16
We obtain data on …rm employment from the Annual Public Enterprise
Survey published by the government. However, employment data is only
available for a subset of the …rms owned by the central government, reducing
the sample size when we consider speci…cations that include employment.
Our data has a number of advantages over other studies that consider
the e¤ects of privatization. First, we have the population of non-…nancial
public …rms owned by the government of India. In terms of asset size, em-
ployment, market share, and political importance the central government
owned …rms form the bulk of state ownership in India. The study of priva-
tization in Mexico by Laporta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) is the only other
study to use the population of non-…nancial privatized …rms. However, the
key advantage of our data is that we also observe state-owned …rms that
were not privatized. Second, although data from the same source, CMIE,
has been used in other contexts, this is the …rst to include data on employ-
ment and ownership for each year. Third, studies investigating the e¤ect of
privatization generally do not contain detailed ownership information such
as the fraction sold, and hence are not able to capture the e¤ect of variations
in ownership (e.g. Frydman et al., 1999, only observe whether a …rm has
been privatized).
Table 1 reports the frequency distribution of privatization between 1991
and 1998 and the average fraction sold in each year. As seen in Table 1 the
largest number of privatizations occurred in 1992, a year after the reforms
were announced, with an average of 12% of shares of 26 …rms being o¤ered
on the stock market. Table 1 also reports the number of …rms in dereserved
sectors and liberalized sectors.
1611 …rms have undergone partial privatization in one tranche only.
125 Results
We investigate the impact of partial privatization on the following broad
measures of pro…tability and e¢ciency: sales, accounting pro…ts, employ-
ment, average product of labor, and the returns to labor. The variables are
described in the Appendix. Table 2 provides summary statistics for selected
variables for 1991-1998 by ownership category.
From Table 2 it appears that partially privatized …rms have higher sales,
pro…ts, labor, average product of labor, assets, and returns to labor than
…rms that remain state-owned. They also appear to receive a lower share of
loans from the government compared to fully state-owned …rms. Although
the average characteristics of these …rms is interesting, we need to establish
whether the observed performance di¤erences arise as a result of partial
privatization. Table 3 presents before-after summary statistics of selected
performance measures for …rms that were privatized between 1991 and 1998.
Since shares of some of the …rms in our sample were sold in more than
one tranche, we de…ne the pre and post measures as average values of the
variables for the years before and after the …rst tranche.
The descriptive statistics in Table 3 show that …rms experience an in-
crease in sales and pro…ts after privatization. Sales are 59 percentage points
higher on average after privatization, with the di¤erence being signi…cant
at the 5 per cent level. Similarly, average pro…ts are signi…cantly higher in
the years following the …rst tranche of privatization, registering an average
increase of 22.6 percentage points. This increase in pro…tability is higher
than found in similar studies. For example Laporta and Lopez-di-Silanes
(1999), comparing the means of performance variables before and after pri-
vatization, …nd that the mean change in operating income to sales after
privatization was 24.1 percentage points in their sample of Mexican …rms.
Partial privatization does not appear to have much of an impact on the
stock of …xed assets, re‡ecting the fact that public sector investments have
been declining since 1991. It also appears that there is a signi…cant decrease
in the average share of government loans and subsidies in total borrowing
after partial privatization.
The before-after estimator above relies on the assumption that among
privatized …rms the mean outcome in the years before privatization are the
same as what would be the mean outcome in the years after in the absence of
privatization. This assumption would be violated if, for example, there are
changes in the overall state of the economy between these years, or if there
are changes in the life-cycle position of some of these privatized …rms. Below
we use panel data to estimate a …rm …xed e¤ects speci…cation which allows
13us to control for macroeconomic changes and estimate the average impact
of private ownership by comparing partially privatized …rms to those that
remain state-owned throughout this period.
5.1 Estimating the e¤ect of partial private ownership
While Table 3 compared the before after performance of …rms that were
partially privatized, we would like to investigate the average impact of pri-
vatization, and variations in performance that arise out of variations in the
level of equity that is private. We investigate the average impact of privatiza-
tion by comparing privatized …rms to …rms that remain state-owned through
1991-1998 by estimating the following …rm …xed e¤ects speci…cation:
yit = ® + PRIVit¯ + Xit° + Y EARtµ + "it;
where PRIVit measures the fraction of equity of …rm i, lying between 0
and 100; that is privately owned in period t. We assess the impact on
pro…tability by examining both sales and accounting pro…ts. Speci…cally
the dependent variables for pro…tability are (log) sales and (log) pro…ts. We
also investigate the e¤ect on e¢ciency with the (log) average product of labor
and the returns to employment as dependent variables. Finally we examine
if partial privatization has an impact on employment with (log) labor as the
dependent variable. The Xit variables are …rm speci…c factors including …rm
size measured by one-year lagged values of (log) gross …xed assets, and the
one-year lagged share of government …nancing in total borrowing. Including
the …rms that remain state-owned as the control group allows us to estimate
the average impact of private ownership, and control for contemporaneous
macroeconomic shocks. This speci…cation also allows for a …rm-speci…c …xed
e¤ect, ®i; which re‡ects …xed di¤erences across …rms that are constant but
unobserved over time, time e¤ects which are common to …rms but vary
over time given by the year dummies Y EAR, and a random unobserved
component "it:
Government loans are also used by Bartel and Harrison (2001) as an
explanatory variable (they use the share of government loans in total in-
vestment) to capture the e¤ects of a soft budget constraint on public sector
…rms. Soft budget constraints are expected to have a negative impact on
…rm performance if they are used by the government to pursue other ob-
jectives. They can also distort managerial incentives because they insulate
public sector managers from the discipline of a bankruptcy threat.17 The
results are presented in Table 4.
17However, La¤ont and Tirole (1993) point out that even private regulated …rms are
14It can be seen from Table 4 that the fraction of equity that is private in a
given year has a positive and statistically signi…cant (at the 1 per cent level)
impact on all pro…tability and labor productivity measures. In column 1
of Table 4 increasing private equity by 10 percentage points would increase
sales by 27 percentage points on average. In column 2 we …nd that the
lagged share of government loans over total borrowing, which is a proxy for
soft budget constraints, has a negative and slightly statistically signi…cant
impact on current sales.18
In columns 3 and 4 we investigate the impact on (log) accounting pro…ts,
and the results are similar to those reported for sales.19 A 10 percentage
point decrease in government ownership would increase pro…ts by 15 per-
centage points and this coe¢cient is also signi…cant at the 1 per cent level.
In column 4 soft budget constraints have a smaller but negative and statis-
tically signi…cant (at the 10 per cent level) impact on pro…ts.
Examining the average impact of privatization on e¢ciency, columns 5
and 6 show that private ownership has a positive and statistically signi…cant
e¤ect (at the 1 per cent level) on the average product of labor as measured
by the (log) ratio of sales to employment.20 Size of capital, as measured
by the log of lagged gross …xed assets, also has a signi…cant and positive
impact on the average product of labor, however the coe¢cient does not re-
main signi…cant when we include the government loans variable. The lagged
share of government loans in total borrowing has no impact on the average
product of labor. In columns 7 and 8 we use returns to employment (the
ratio of operating income to employment) as the dependent variable. This
measure of e¢ciency has also been used by LaPorta and Lopez-di-Silanes
(1999) among others. The coe¢cient of PRIV is positive and statistically
signi…cant at the 1 per cent level. In contrast to its e¤ect on sale revenues
and pro…ts, the lagged share of government loans in total borrowing has a
positive and signi…cant impact on returns to employment.
Investigating the average e¤ect of private ownership on employment in
columns 9 and 10 of Table 4, we …nd that the level of private ownership
bailed out by regulators, hence the problem with soft budget constraints is not exclusively
restricted to public …rms.
18On average 13 …rms in each year do not report government loans received in the
previous year. 4 …rms do not report government loans in any years.
19The fewer number of observations is due to the fact that six …rms do not report pro…ts
in 1997. We ran all the speci…cations in Tables 4 and 5 with the smallest balanced panel
of 1506 …rms. The coe¢cients retain their signi…cance and sign and di¤er very slightly in
magnitude. These results are available on request.
20There are fewer observations since we were unable to obtain employment data for
some …rms in some years. Only one …rm is missing employment in all years.
15does not lead to a decline in employment, and is even slightly positive and
signi…cant when we do not control for the lagged share of government loans
in total borrowing. This result is consistent with the conventional wisdom
that partial privatization has not resulted in labor restructuring. Moreover,
this also o¤ers further evidence that the government’s objectives have not
undergone a signi…cant change since there do not appear to be any layo¤s of
surplus workers following partial privatization. Finally, we report the F-test
of joint signi…cance for the …rm …xed-e¤ects and …nd that the …xed e¤ects
are jointly di¤erent from zero in all the speci…cations.
The evidence regarding the average impact of partial privatization on
revenues, pro…tability, and operating e¢ciency suggests that managers of
these …rms undertake e¢ciency and pro…t-enhancing actions, possibly be-
cause public stock price information facilitates monitoring of manager per-
formance. One could argue that without bankruptcy risks or a market for
corporate control, managers need not respond to more high-powered incen-
tives. However, the presence of a market for managerial skills could lead to
restructuring e¤orts among managers whose performance is now being mon-
itored more frequently or more accurately (Fama, 1980). Alternatively, the
additional information on …rm performance may also be used by the gov-
ernment and workers of the …rm to monitor managers more e¤ectively. As
mentioned earlier, the alternative explanation that managers’ incentives are
not a¤ected by better information, but instead by the possibility of losing
their jobs after privatization, does not provide an unambiguous prediction
since managers may also take actions to discourage potential buyers. It
may also be the case that the increase in revenues and pro…ts are a result
of a reduction in corruption, rather than an increase in production. Due
to increased monitoring of …rm performance managers may stop illegally
redirecting output to non-paying customers (Laporta and Lopez-di-Silanes,
1999, argue that this may also have been the case with Mexican …rms).
It may be worthwhile to mention that we have also investigated the
di¤erence between pre and post privatization performance. In particular we
include a dummy variable in the above estimations for the years preceding
the …rst tranche in which a …rm is sold. In contrast to other studies that …nd
revenue and pro…tability measures increase prior to privatization (Dewenter
and Malatesta, 2001) we …nd that sales and pro…tability are likely to be
signi…cantly lower in the prior years. Hence there is little evidence to suggest
that …rms manipulate their accounts prior to privatization. To save space
we do not report these results.
That private ownership has an impact on …rm performance at all is
surprising since on average less than two percent of equity is private over
16this period in our sample. Even among the 36 privatized …rms the average
value of PRIV is 16:32 per cent between 1991 and 1998. Moreover all
these …rms remained under government control over this period, leading us
to conclude that the average impact of this variable captures the e¤ect of
increased monitoring on managers rather than restructuring brought about
by a change in owner objectives.
5.2 Evaluating the e¤ect of increased competition
We now explore another possible source of variation in …rm performance
by investigating whether partial privatization still has an impact when we
control for changes in the competitive environment of …rms. We estimate
the previous speci…cations by introducing two dummy variables that capture
the changing e¤ect over time of increased competition. The …rst is a dummy
variable that equals one if the …rm is an industry which was originally re-
served for the public sector and subsequently opened to the private sector,
DEREST, which is interacted with a time trend. The second is a dummy
variable that equals one if the …rm is an industry where the government
removed restrictions on foreign entry, LIBT, and it is also interacted with
a time trend. An advantage of using these variables is that they measure
potential entry due to deregulation rather than actual measures of market
concentration and entry after deregulation, and hence do not su¤er from
endogeneity problems. The results are presented in Table 5.
The coe¢cient of the fraction of private equity remains positive, of simi-
lar magnitude, and statistically signi…cant at 1 per cent for sales, pro…tabil-
ity, and the e¢ciency measures when we control for changes in competitive
conditions. The lagged share of government loans in total borrowing con-
tinues to have a negative and statistically signi…cant impact on sales and
pro…ts, and a positive impact on returns to labor. The impact of dereserva-
tion, as measured by the coe¢cient of DEREST, is positive and statistically
signi…cant for sales and pro…ts. Dereservation has the additional e¤ect of
reducing employment in …rms compared to …rms in industries that were
not restricted to government enterprises21. Freeing restrictions on private
participation does not, however, have an impact on the average product of
labor and the returns to employment, as seen in columns 4 and 5. In con-
trast to the e¤ect of dereservation, liberalization of restrictions on foreign
entry has a statistically signi…cant negative impact on sales. The di¤er-
ent e¤ect of dereservation and liberalization on sales is interesting since
21We do not have …rms in our data which belong to sectors that are still reserved such
as arms and ammunition, atomic energy, and railways.
17both policies increase competition. The positive e¤ect on …rm sales in sec-
tors previously reserved for state-owned …rms may re‡ect the impact of less
government intervention, or partnerships with private domestic and foreign
…rms. Although most of the …rms in liberalized sectors were already com-
peting with domestic companies before 1991, it has been argued that prior
to the economic reforms, most industries, even those with domestic private
sector …rms, were not globally competitive because they enjoyed protection
from imports and other favorable government policies. Hence at least in the
short run the entry of foreign companies and foreign imports has adversely
a¤ected sales in …rms in these sectors.
Relative to sectors that were never reserved for the government and
those sectors that have not been opened to foreign companies, …rms in both
dereserved and liberalized sectors have lower employment on average, as seen
in columns 6 of Table 5. Hence competitive pressures increase allocative
e¢ciency by forcing …rms to undertake some labor restructuring.
The results of Table 5 indicate that the e¤ect of selling equity in a given
year on …rm performance cannot be attributed to changes in the competitive
environment since PRIV continues to have a statistically signi…cant impact
(at the 1 per cent level) on revenues, pro…ts, and productivity. From the evi-
dence it also appears that competition and privatization are complementary
in their e¤ect on …rm performance, with partial sales increasing pro…tability
and productive e¢ciency on average, while competition appears to increase
allocative e¢ciency. It also appears that the e¤ect on managers’ incentives
of dereservation policies has been positive, at least in terms of increasing
sales and pro…ts. However, contrary to Vickers and Yarrow (1991), the evi-
dence suggests that competitive pressures alone would not fully address this
ine¢ciency since competition policy does not have a broad impact on labor
productivity.
5.3 Addressing problems in estimation strategy
The main advantage of a …xed e¤ects estimation in the program evaluation
literature is that it would control for the sort of selection bias that may
arise if for example more shares are likely to be sold of better …rms, where
the unobservable characteristics do not change over time. However …xed
e¤ect estimations may result in inconsistent estimates if there is dynamic
selection into privatization. For example, we would overestimate the impact
of privatization if privatized …rms experience a decline in performance prior
to privatization which other …rms do not, a phenomenon commonly referred
to as “Ashenfelter’s dip” (Ashenfelter, 1978). Like Bartel and Harrison
18(2001), we compare the pre-privatization performance of …rms to that of
…rms that did not change ownership. Table 6 compares the change in sales,
change in employment, and change in average product between t and t ¡ 1
for …rms privatized in year t with …rms that did not change ownership in
that year. The results show that …rms do not perform di¤erently in terms of
sales, employment or average product compared to the control group prior
to privatization.
Dynamic selection bias may also arise for example if the government is
likely to select …rms for privatization that have better management, or …rms
that are likely to adapt better to the new liberalization policies, but these
factors are unobservable to the researcher and not …xed over time. It would
be impossible to control for all such factors particularly if they are unob-
served and evolve over time. However, if …rms that are selected for privatiza-
tion share similar characteristics that are not captured by pre-privatization
measures and materialize over time, then comparing …rms privatized in a
given year to a control group of …rms that have also been selected for pri-
vatization, but are privatized in other years, may allow us to control for
this type of selection bias. Frydman et al. (1999) use this approach by
comparing …rms that were privatized later to …rms that were privatized ear-
lier. Since privatization is distributed over several years in our data, in any
given year we also observe …rms privatized in later years that potentially
share similar unobservable time variant characteristics. In the control group
we also include all the …rms that have been partially and fully privatized
between 1998 (the last year of our sample) and 2001, including 5 …rms for
which sales negotiations were completed in late 2001. We estimate the spec-
i…cations in Table 5 and report the results in Table 7. The coe¢cient of
the PRIV variable remains similar to Tables 4 and 5 in magnitude and sta-
tistical signi…cance for almost all the speci…cations other than employment.
It is interesting to note that the lagged share of government loans in total
borrowing now has a signi…cant and positive impact on employment in the
smaller sample, consistent with Shleifer and Vishny’s (1994) view that the
government may use loans to induce …rms to retain surplus labor.
The institutional background of the disinvestment process in India leads
us to believe that dynamic selection is not a major problem. The debate in
policy circles and in the media has focused on the absence of a privatization
plan on which …rms to sell, how much to sell, and when to sell. An editorial
in the prominent Indian business newspaper The Economic Times (May,
2001) re‡ecting general perception about the process thus far commented:
“The disinvestment programme of the government is completely incoherent
and lacks transparency and conviction.”
19Griliches and Hausman (1986) note that errors in variables can be height-
ened by …xed e¤ects. We do not think measurement error is a problem since
the privatization variable is quite statistically signi…cant, while measurement
error tends to bias coe¢cients towards zero.
We also conduct some other robustness checks. In particular we reesti-
mate excluding oil and gas companies which are arguably the more pro…table
companies that were partially privatized. We do not …nd any evidence that
these results are being driven by particular sectors. For example for the
speci…cation in column 1 of Table 4 we …nd that the coe¢cient (standard
error) of PRIV is :029(:004) and signi…cant at the 1 per cent level, and it
retains its sign, magnitude and signi…cance for the other speci…cations as
well. The results are similar when we include the competition variables.
We also estimate these speci…cations by excluding …rms owned by re-
gional governments. Once again we …nd the results to be substantially sim-
ilar with all the coe¢cients retaining their sign and signi…cance. There is
no evidence that the results of Tables 4 and 5 are a¤ected by the inclusion
of these …rms.
6 Conclusion
We …nd that partial privatization in the form of di¤use minority sales of
shares has a positive impact on …rm pro…tability and e¢ciency without be-
ing accompanied by a decline in employment. Since there is no transfer of
control it is di¢cult to argue that the observed improvement in performance
occurs because of a shift in owners’ objectives to pro…t maximization. In-
stead, improvements in …rm performance are more likely to have occurred
because of a change in manager incentives as a result of more information
on and monitoring of managers after partial privatization. Partial priva-
tization can also increase the incentives of stock market analysts to follow
the performance of a government owned …rm because of the possibility that
more shares will be sold in the future.
Policies that increase competition also have an impact on …rm perfor-
mance. We …nd that removal of entry barriers in sectors that were restricted
to government-owned …rms has a favorable impact on sales, but liberaliza-
tion of restrictions on foreign ownership appears, at least in the short run,
to reduce sales. Moreover, competitive pressures appear to force managers
to make layo¤s.Our results suggest that both partial privatization and com-
petition a¤ect the performance of these public sector …rms.
One useful extension of this analysis would be to include additional pol-
20icy variables measuring changes in market conditions such as trade policy
changes. It would also be useful to include private sector …rms in this analy-
sis and compare government-owned …rms to their private sector counter-
parts.
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23APPENDIX: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES USED IN TABLES 2-7 
 
Variable  Description 
 
SALES 
 
Log of annual revenue generated by an enterprise from its main business activity 
measured by charges to customers for goods supplied and services rendered. 
Excludes income from activities not related to main business, such as dividends, 
interest, and rents in the case of industrial firms, as well as non-recurring income. 
  
PROFITS  Log of the annual excess of income over all expenditures except tax, depreciation, 
interest payments, rent, and extra ordinary expenditures. Does not include extra-
ordinary income and income from sources not related to main business activity.  
 
LABOR  Log of the total number of employees in a year including managerial staff. 
 
ASSETS  Log of annual gross fixed assets which include movable and immovable assets as 
well as assets which are in the process of being installed 
 
AVERAGE PRODUCT OF 
OF LABOR 
 
Log of the ratio of sales over total employment 
GOVERNMENT 
LOANS AND 
SUBSIDIES 
 
Log of the sum of annual loans received from the central and state governments 
and government owned development institutions, and subsidies given by the 
government.  
TOTAL 
BORROWING 
Log of total borrowings including loans from banks, institutions, debentures, 
other companies, tax deferrals, foreign and other borrowings. 
 
GOVT LOAN/ 
TOT BORR 
 
Ratio of government loans to total borrowings 
RETURNS TO 
LABOR 
Ratio of operating income to total employment. Operating income is measured as 
sales minus the total cost of raw materials, wages and energy costs.  
 
DEREST  Dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is in an industry that was reserved 
for government-owned firms until 1991, interacted with a time trend 
 
LIBT  Dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is in an industry that removed 
restrictions on foreign ownership after 1991, interacted with a time trend 
 
PRIV  Variable that lies between 0 and 100 measuring the fraction of equity that is 
private in a firm in a given year 
 
YEAR  Year dummies excluding 1991 
 TABLE 1 
PRIVATIZATION BY YEAR 
 
 
YEAR 
 
 
NUMBER OF 
FIRMS SOLD 
 
AVERAGE 
FRACTION OF 
EQUITY SOLD 
(standard errors in 
parentheses) 
 
MAXIMUM 
FRACTION OF 
EQUITY SOLD 
 
MINIMUM 
FRACTION OF 
EQUITY SOLD 
 
1991 
 
3 
 
17.24 
(19.53) 
 
 
38.84 
 
.12 
1992  26  11.77 
(7.60) 
 
20.1  1.23 
1993  16  3.65 
(3.66) 
 
10.08  .06 
1994  9  3.24 
(6.08) 
 
17.6  .01 
1995  18  7.06 
(7.69) 
 
23.1  .01 
1996  9  2.24 
(2.86) 
 
9.25  .03 
1997  3  15.90 
(9.06) 
 
26  8.5 
1998  1  17 
 
17  17 
DISTRIBUTION OF DERESERVED FIRMS AND LIBERALIZED FIRMS (NUMBER OF FIRM 
YEARS) 
  Dereserved Firms  Non dereserved Firms 
Liberalized 
Firms 
160  278 
Non- 
liberalized 
Firms 
475  1045 
 
Notes:  36 central government firms partially privatized between 1991 and 1998 of which some are sold 
in several tranches. 2 state government firms also included. Equity sold lies between 0 and 100.  TABLE 2 
SUMMARY STATISTICS BY OWNERSHIP CATEGORY 1991-1998 
 
  ALL 
FIRMS 
PARTIALLY PRIVATIZED 
FIRMS 
STATE-OWNED 
FIRMS 
 
SALES 
 
 
828.32 
(3316.56) 
N=1958 
 
3907.14 
(8132.71) 
N=234 
 
410.42 
(1444.68) 
N=1724 
 
PROFITS 
 
 
391.43 
(501.88) 
N=1952 
 
861.51 
(1093.99) 
N=233 
 
327.71 
(300.66) 
N=1719 
 
EMPLOYEES 
 
 
9612.93 
(23637.57) 
N=1507 
 
19775.88 
(33825.63) 
N=212 
 
7949.18 
(21071.61) 
N=1295 
 
ASSETS 
 
 
745.54 
(2892.85) 
N=1958 
 
2650.03 
(6135.19) 
N=234 
 
487.04 
(1963.56) 
N=1724 
 
AVERAGE PRODUCT OF 
LABOR 
 
 
.134 
(.302) 
N=1507 
 
.328 
(.490) 
N=212 
 
.082 
(.162) 
N=1295 
 
RETURNS TO LABOR 
 
 
.046 
(.144) 
N=1507 
 
.143 
(.289) 
N=212 
 
.030 
(.094) 
N=1295 
 
GOVT LOAN 
/ TOT BORR 
 
 
.297 
(.359) 
N=1958 
 
 .141 
(.223) 
N=234 
 
.318 
(.369) 
N=1724 
 
Notes: Variables are not measured in logs. Units equal millions of US$. Labor measured in actual number 
of workers. N refers to firm years for each variable and ownership category. Share of government loans 
over total borrowing is lagged one year as in regressions.  Sample size is same as in Tables 3, 4 and 5. TABLE 3 
COMPARING PERFORMANCE BEFORE AND AFTER PRIVATIZATION 
(1990-1998) 
 
VARIABLE  MEAN BEFORE 
PRIVATIZATION 
MEAN AFTER 
PRIVATIZATION 
POST-PRE 
t-statistic of difference 
in means 
 
REVENUES 
SALES  6.293 
(.193) 
 
6.883 
(.120) 
2.173
** 
PROFITS  6.131 
(.080) 
 
6.357 
(.050) 
2.007
** 
EFFICIENCY 
AVERAGE PRODUCT 
OF LABOR 
 
.206 
(.042) 
.229 
(.019) 
.500 
ASSETS 
GROSS FIXED 
ASSETS 
6.250 
(.231) 
 
6.161 
(.157) 
-.255 
FINANCING 
GOVERNMENT 
LOANS AND 
SUBSIDIES 
 
2.771 
(.317) 
 
2.898 
(.149) 
.367 
TOTAL BORROWING  4.775 
(.311) 
 
5.351 
(.154) 
1.630
* 
GOVT LOAN  
/ TOT BORR 
.194 
(.035) 
 
.136 
(.014) 
-1.700
* 
 
 
Notes: All variables measured in logs, standard errors of means in parentheses. Mean values computed for 
firm performance before and after the first tranche of privatization for each firm. 
 * Significant at the 10 per cent level 
  ** Significant at the 5 per cent level 
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level  TABLE 4 
THE IMPACT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP ON FIRM PERFORMANCE  
COMPARING PRIVATIZED FIRMS TO STATE-OWNED FIRMS (1990-1998) 
(Fixed Effects Estimates) 
  SALESt  PROFITt  AVERAGE 
PRODUCTt 
RETURNS TO 
LABORt 
LABORt 
 
PRIVi,t 
 
.027
*** 
(.004) 
 
.023
*** 
(.004) 
 
.015
*** 
(.002) 
 
.014
*** 
(.003) 
 
.006
*** 
(.001) 
 
.005
*** 
(.001) 
 
.008
*** 
(.001) 
 
.006
*** 
(.001) 
 
.004
* 
(.002) 
 
.002 
(.002) 
 
 
GOVT LOAN 
/TOT BORRi,t-1 
 
- 
 
-.119
* 
(.067) 
 
- 
 
-.058
* 
(.034) 
 
- 
 
.008 
(.010) 
 
- 
 
.023
** 
(.010) 
 
- 
 
.036 
(.042) 
 
 
ASSETS i,t-1 
 
.028
*** 
(.009) 
 
 
.016 
(.011) 
 
-.005 
(.005) 
 
-.004 
(.006) 
 
.003
** 
(.001) 
 
.002 
(.002) 
 
.004
** 
 (.002) 
 
.003
** 
(.002) 
 
.007 
(.006) 
 
.001 
(.007) 
 
 
YEAR 
DUMMIES 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Number of 
Firm-year 
Observations 
 
2063 
 
1958 
  
 
2057 
  
 
1952 
 
 
1582 
 
 
1506 
 
 
1582 
 
 
1506 
 
 
1602 
 
 
1522 
 
R
2 
 
Pr>F(k, NT-k)
 a 
 
Pr>F 
b  
 
.0508 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
.0414 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
.0494 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
.0478 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
.1244 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
.1030 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
.1558 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
.1313 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
.0050 
 
.552 
 
.000
*** 
.0041 
 
.810 
 
.000
*** 
 
Notes:  Specifications control for firm level fixed effects (within regressions).  Standard errors are in 
parentheses. All RHS variables except PRIV are lagged one year. All performance variables are measured 
in logarithms except returns to labor and the share of government loans in total borrowing.   
    * Significant at the 10 per cent level 
  ** Significant at the 5 per cent level 
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level 
a: Joint significance test for all coefficients 
b: Joint significance test for firm fixed effects, F statistic distributed with (N, NT-N-k-1) degrees of 
freedom, where N equals number of firms, T equals number of years, and k is the number of RHS 
variables. TABLE 5 
THE IMPACT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND COMPETITION  
ON FIRM PERFORMANCE  
COMPARING PRIVATIZED FIRMS TO STATE-OWNED FIRMS (1990-1998) 
(Fixed Effects Estimates) 
   
SALESt 
 
PROFITt 
AVERAGE 
PRODUCTt 
RETURNS TO 
LABORt 
 
LABORt 
 
PRIVi,t 
 
 
.021
*** 
(.004) 
 
.014
*** 
(.003) 
 
.005
*** 
(.001) 
 
.006
*** 
(.001) 
 
.004
* 
(.002) 
 
DERESTi,t 
 
.048
*** 
(.012) 
 
.016
*** 
(.006) 
 
.003 
(.002) 
 
.001 
        (.002) 
 
-.022
*** 
(.007) 
 
LIBTi,t 
 
 
-.034
*** 
(.010) 
 
.003 
(.005) 
 
 -.001 
  (.001) 
 
-.001 
(.001) 
 
-.025
*** 
(.006) 
 
GOVT LOAN  
/ TOT BORRi,t-1 
 
-.114
* 
(.066) 
 
-.057
* 
(.034) 
 
.009 
(.010) 
 
.023
** 
(.009) 
 
.031 
(.042) 
 
ASSETSi,t-1 
 
 
.019
* 
(.011) 
 
-.004 
(.006) 
 
.002 
(.002) 
 
.003
** 
(.001) 
 
.000 
(.007) 
 
YEAR 
DUMMIES 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Number of 
Firm-year 
Observations 
 
1958  
 
1952 
 
1506 
 
1506 
 
1522 
 
R
2 
 
Pr>F(k, NT-k)
 a 
 
Pr>F 
b  
 
 
.0542 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
 
.0525 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
 
.1048 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
 
.1318 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
 
.0284 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
 
Notes: Specifications control for firm level fixed effects (within regressions).  Standard errors are in 
parentheses. All RHS variables except PRIV are lagged one year. All performance variables are measured 
in logarithms except returns to labor and the share of government loans in total borrowing and the dummy 
variables DEREST and LIBT.   
    * Significant at the 10 per cent level 
  ** Significant at the 5 per cent level 
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level 
a: Joint significance test for all coefficients 
b: Joint significance test for firm fixed effects, F statistic distributed with (N, NT-N-k-1) degrees of 
freedom , where N equals number of firms, T equals number of years, and k is the number of RHS 
variables. TABLE 6 
MEAN CHANGE IN PERFORMANCE BEFORE PRIVATIZATION (1990-1998) 
 
  PRIVATIZED 
FIRMS 
UNPRIVATIZED 
FIRMS 
PRIVATIZED–
UNPRIVATIZED 
t-statistic of difference in 
means 
 
SALESt - SALESt-1  
 
.115 
(.020) 
 
.059 
(.011) 
 
1.07 
 
LABORt - LABOR t-1  
 
-.003 
(.004) 
 
-.028 
(.010) 
 
.604 
 
AVERAGE PRODUCT t – 
AVERAGE PRODUCT t-1 
 
 
.018 
(.005) 
 
.009 
(.002) 
 
1.07 
 
Notes: Standard errors of means in parentheses for all growth measures.  Performance measures are log 
differences. Year t is year of privatization.  TABLE 7 
THE IMPACT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND COMPETITION  
ON FIRM PERFORMANCE  
COMPARING PRIVATIZED FIRMS TO FIRMS SELECTED FOR PRIVATIZATION  
(1990-1998) 
(Fixed Effects Estimates) 
  SALESt  PROFITt  AVERAGE 
PRODUCTt 
RETURNS TO 
LABORt 
LABORt 
 
PRIVi,t 
 
.020
*** 
(.003) 
 
.019
*** 
(.003)
 
 
 
.014
*** 
(.002) 
 
.014
*** 
(.002) 
 
.005
*** 
(.001) 
 
.005
*** 
(.001) 
 
.007
*** 
(.001) 
 
.007
*** 
(.001) 
 
.002
*** 
(.001) 
 
.004
***
(.001)
 
 
GOVT LOAN 
/TOT BORRi,t-1 
 
-.433
*** 
(.139) 
 
-.388
*** 
(.144) 
 
.027 
(.082) 
 
.010
 
(.085) 
 
.022 
(.034) 
 
.016 
(.035) 
 
.075
* 
(.044) 
 
.076
* 
(.045) 
 
.086
*** 
(.033) 
 
.036 
(.031)
 
 
DEREST 
 
 
-- 
 
.025 
(.018) 
 
-- 
 
-.008 
(.011) 
 
-- 
 
-.004 
(.005) 
 
-- 
 
-.0002 
(.006) 
 
-- 
 
-.029
***
(.004) 
 
 
LIBT 
 
 
-- 
 
.005 
(.019) 
 
-- 
 
.013 
(.011) 
 
-- 
 
-.007 
(.005) 
 
-- 
 
-.010
* 
(.006) 
 
-- 
 
-.005 
(.004)
 
 
ASSETS i,t-1 
 
-.00003
 
(.020) 
 
 
.002 
(.020) 
 
.010 
(.012) 
 
.007 
(.011) 
 
.008
* 
(.005) 
 
.008
* 
(.005) 
 
.011
* 
 (.006) 
 
.012
* 
(.006) 
 
.002 
(.005) 
 
.001 
(.004)
 
 
YEAR 
DUMMIES 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Number of 
Firm-year 
Observations 
 
 
325 
 
 
325 
 
 
323 
 
 
323 
 
 
290 
 
 
290 
 
290 
 
 
290 
  
 
292 
  
 
 
292 
  
 
R
2 
 
Pr>F(k, NT-k)
 a 
 
Pr>F 
b  
 
.3353 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
 
.3401 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
.2947 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
.2950 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
.2839 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
.2928 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
.2306 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
.2395 
 
.000
*** 
 
.000
*** 
.0815 
 
.013
** 
 
.000
*** 
.2586
 
.000
***
 
.000
***
 
 
Notes: Specifications control for firm level fixed effects (within regressions).  Standard errors are in 
parentheses. All RHS variables except PRIV are lagged one year. All performance variables are measured 
in logarithms except returns to labor and the share of government loans in total borrowing and the dummy 
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